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Abstract
Th is paper is dedicated to the investigation of an important, but not particularly well 
known connection between the work of Hegel and Dewey’s early educational ideas. 
A brief exposition of Hegel’s position in the Philosophy of Right is off ered, with a 
particular focus on Hegel’s idea of absolute freedom. Th is exposition is followed by 
an analysis of one of Dewey’s earliest books, Outlines of a Critical Th eory of Ethics. 
Hegelian notions of absolute freedom are shown to be present in the Outlines, and 
textual evidence is then presented which links the theoretical framework of the 
Outlines to Dewey’s early educational thought.
Introduction
Scholars agree that Hegel had an important infl uence on John Dewey’s early work.1 
Unfortunately, the precise nature of this infl uence is not always easy to discern; in 
his early works, Dewey mentions Hegel only rarely, and seldom refers to him. How-
ever, in his letters and in his later works, Dewey concedes that Hegel had a strong 
infl uence on his philosophy. For example, in a 1930 essay, “From Absolutism to 
Experimentalism,” Dewey acknowledges the infl uence of Hegel, noting that “ac-
quaintance with Hegel has left  a permanent deposit in my thinking.”2 
Th is paper is dedicated to the investigation of an important but not particu-
larly well known, connection between the work of Hegel and Dewey’s early educa-
tional ideas.3 Th e analysis is divided into three parts. Th e fi rst section of the paper is 
devoted to the preliminary task of outlining Hegel’s conception of freedom. A sub-
sequent analysis then traces, at length, how this idea forms the leitmotif of Dewey’s 
Outlines of a Critical Th eory of Ethics (1891). In the fi nal section, Hegelian freedom 
is linked to some of Dewey’s educational work in the mid-to-late 1890s. Although it 
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is commonly thought that Hegel’s formative infl uence on Dewey’s work diminished 
aft er the Psychology (1887), this analysis demonstrates that an important strand of 
Hegelian thought infl uenced Dewey’s educational thinking in a profound way. 
Hegel’s Conception of Freedom 
Obviously, it is not particularly interesting to ask whether Dewey was a Hegelian—
the historical record is clear and uncontroversial on this point. However, when one 
asks how Dewey was a Hegelian, matters get murkier and more interesting. In order 
to see the Hegelian infl uence in Dewey’s work, it is necessary to have an understand-
ing of Hegel. Th erefore, in the fi rst section of this paper, an attempt will be made 
to outline Hegel’s notion of freedom, in order that we may then detect similar ele-
ments in Dewey’s early work, and, ultimately, in School and Society. 
Freedom is central to Hegel’s philosophy; Hegel believed that a certain kind 
of freedom was the highest good.4 Happiness may appear to be a more obvious can-
didate for the position of highest good—as Aristotle fi rst pointed out, happiness 
is a state which everyone wants to achieve. Freedom, by contrast, if we defi ne it as 
an absence of external restrictions on action, is quite consistent with a kind of life 
that most would think of as miserable—one can, for example, be poverty stricken 
and still be free in this sense. Yet this kind of “negative freedom” is not the type 
of freedom in which Hegel was interested. Although Hegel occasionally discusses 
this type of freedom (he calls it “personal freedom”), he does not praise it. At one 
point, he comments, “such an idea can only be taken to reveal an utter immaturity 
of thought, for it contains not even an inkling of the absolutely free will.”5
Another variety of freedom that appears in the Philosophy of Right is what 
Hegel calls “subjective freedom.” In his remarks on this type of freedom, Hegel re-
fers to the example of Plato’s Republic. In the ideal city described in the Republic, 
the Guardians assign particular craft s to the people living in the city.6 Hegel com-
ments, “In these circumstances the principle of subjective freedom is lacking, i.e., 
the principle that the individual’s substantive activity . . . shall be mediated through 
his particular volition.”7 In Hegel’s Ethical Th ought, Allen Wood off ers the follow-
ing comments on subjective freedom: “[W]hat it directly refers to is a kind of ac-
tion, one that is refl ective, conscious, explicitly chosen by the agent . . . Subjective 
freedom also includes actions that satisfy the agent’s reflective interest  i n  see-
ing our chosen plans and projects carried successfully to completion.”8 Subjective 
freedom, which is characterized by thoughtfully chosen action (as opposed to the 
absence of restrictions, as in the case of personal freedom), is more appealing to 
Hegel than personal freedom. Still, although Hegel thought that subjective freedom 
is important for people, it was not the highest good. Th at distinction is reserved for 
something that Hegel called “absolute freedom.” 
Hegel invented a new term to describe absolute freedom: beisichselbstsein, 
which means “being with oneself.” Like many German neologisms, the word has 
many meanings built into it. Wood suggests that beisichselbstsein includes notions 
of well-integrated self that has achieved self-awareness and self-mastery.9 Even more 
Uncovering Hegelian Connections    69
Volume 26 (1)  2010
importantly, Wood notes that beisichselbstsein is a relational term; one is always 
being with oneself in some other that has been overcome.10 Hegel commented on 
the process by which we come to be with ourselves in objects: “I do not penetrate 
an object until I understand it; it then ceases to stand over against me and I have 
taken from it the character of its own which it had in opposition to me. Just as Adam 
said to Eve: ‘Th ou art fl esh of my fl esh and bone of my bone,’ so mind says: ‘Th is 
is mind of my mind and its foreign character has disappeared.’”11 Th is is a rather 
elaborate description for a phenomenon that that is quite familiar. If one wanted 
to describe beisichselbstsein in a more conventional way, one might say that it sig-
nifi es “having it together” in an extremely strong sense—a sense which goes above 
and beyond the everyday meaning of the phrase. When you have it together in this 
special sense, you understand yourself, you control yourself, you understand your 
endeavors, and you believe in your endeavors. Th e things and people with which 
or with whom you work are not alien to you—you have overcome their foreign-
ness and they have been incorporated into your self. You are with yourself in these 
things; they are mind of your mind. 
Hegel’s notion of absolute freedom is embedded within a larger philosophi-
cal system; his philosophy of history is a narrative of humanity’s progress toward 
freedom. Hegel suggested that humans have been trying to grasp the meaning of 
freedom and embed it in a social order. Th is striving is described by Hegel as the 
movement of Spirit, a description which has occasioned a great deal of confusion. 
Contrary to what some believe, Spirit is not a godlike entity that determines the 
progress of human history from above. When Hegel discussed the “world spirit” 
and “national spirits,” he was pointing towards the way humans, and particular 
groups of humans, collectively understand freedom and instantiate this under-
standing within the structure of a particular society. Hegel summed up the devel-
opment of the understanding freedom in human history as follows: “Firstly, that 
of the Orientals, who knew only that one is free, then that of the Greek and Roman 
world, which knew that some are free, and fi nally our own knowledge that all men 
as such are free, and that man is by nature free.”12 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
presented “a system of objective spirit for modern culture, the latest and deepest 
form in which spirit has attained to knowledge of its essence and expressed that 
essence in a social world.”13 In other words, Hegel outlined a particular kind of so-
cial order and a corresponding set of individual attitudes, within which (the social 
order) and with which (the attitudes) we can be free.14 He described this way of life 
in a section of the book entitled “Ethical Life” (Sittlichkeit). 
Th e highest institution of ethical life, according to Hegel, is the state. Hegel 
gives a detailed description of the structure of the state he has in mind, but, for our 
purposes (namely, relating Hegel to Dewey), the most important and interesting 
aspect of Hegel’s state is not its objective side (its social structure), but rather its 
subjective side (the attitudes people have toward it).15 A promising place to begin 
considering Hegel’s views on the subjective side of the state is his view of patriotism: 
“Patriotism is oft en understood to mean only a readiness for exceptional sacrifi ces 
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and actions. Essentially, however, it is the sentiment which, in the relationships of 
our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognizes that the com-
munity is one’s substantive groundwork and end.”16 Th is view diff ers drastically 
from the conventional fl ag-waving, self-martyring understanding of patriotism. 
In the Hegelian state, patriotism means participating wholeheartedly in a recipro-
cal arrangement whereby the community sustains the citizen, and the good citizen 
looks to see how she can improve her community. 
Still, some may not fi nd these pronouncements about the state particularly 
reassuring. Recognizing “that the community is one’s substantive groundwork and 
end” might be fi ne for people who have altruistic tendencies, but it also seems as 
though it might also compromise individual liberty, or, to use a Hegelian term, sub-
jective freedom. Surely, one does not want to be absolutely free if one cannot also be 
subjectively free. Hegel, however, did not feel that individuals must abandon their 
particular interests in the face of the demands of the state. Instead, he thought that 
there was a harmony between the universal interest (the good of the community) 
and people’s particular individual goods. He commented:
But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its 
particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain 
explicit recognition for their right but, for one thing, they also pass over of 
their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, 
they know and will the universal . . . they take it as their end and aim and 
are active in its pursuit. Th e result is that the universal does not prevail or 
achieve completion except along with particular interests.17
Suppose, for example, that an individual chooses to be a teacher. Th is occupation 
is congruent with her particular interests, and by pursuing this occupation, she is 
exercising her subjective freedom. Yet, under Hegel’s conception, she not only pur-
sues being a teacher for the sake of her own interests, but also with a view toward 
the interests of the community. Perhaps she is interested in improving children’s 
welfare in school, or perhaps she is a professor in an economics department, helping 
to make the civil society function more smoothly. When one’s personal interest and 
the social interest align in this way, one is free in the absolute sense.18 In this state, 
the interests of others are not “other” for the individual; they are, in a sense, a part 
of the individual’s own interests. Allen Wood sums up this state of mind: “Individu-
als must experience devotion to the common good not as a sacrifi ce of the private 
for the sake of something ‘higher,’ but simply as the ever-present deeper purpose 
behind everyday life which prevents it from being a mere private self-seeking.”19
The connection to Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics 
Before proceeding to the task of linking Dewey with Hegel, however, it is necessary 
to allay an important misconception about the Philosophy of Right. It is oft en sug-
gested that this book is simply a glorifi cation of the nineteenth-century Prussian 
state. In the preface to his biography of Hegel, Terry Pinkard notes that this is one 
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of the long-lasting myths about Hegel’s thought. Th is myth, says Pinkard, is “clearly 
and demonstrably wrong, [and] has been known to be wrong in scholarly circles for 
a long time now.”20 Although Hegel was not an exponent of modern representative 
democracy, freedom is the cornerstone of his ethical thought. One might object, of 
course, that Hegel has an unusual description of freedom. Yet, as I have noted, Hegel 
thought that subjective freedom was a prerequisite for absolute freedom. Further-
more, as Allen Wood points out, “Hegel’s state has a very liberal look to it.”21 Th is 
may be one of the reasons why Dewey, a dedicated democrat, used some of the most 
important theoretical elements of the Philosophy of Right when he wrote Outlines 
of a Critical Th eory of Ethics (henceforth to be referred to as Outlines). 
Notably, previous commentators on Dewey have not pointed out the fact 
that the Outlines has some strong similarities with the Philosophy of Right.22 Th is 
is quite understandable, since Dewey was not explicit about the nature of the link 
between the Hegel’s book and his own. Still, there is an initial clue which may put 
one on the right track. In the Outlines, Dewey makes a direct reference to Hegel.23 
He adds, to this reference, the following footnote: “I hardly need say how largely 
I am indebted in the treatment of this topic, and indeed, in the whole matter of 
the “ethical world,” to Hegel.”24 Another worthwhile clue can be found in Dewey’s 
method of laying out the “Division of Ethics” in his introduction to the book. His 
outline begins with right, proceeds to a consideration of duty, which then leads to 
a discussion of the question of freedom. Once this discussion is complete, Dewey 
says that he will “take up the various forms and institutions in which the good is 
objectively realized, the family, state, etc.”25 Th is outline mirrors the structure of 
the Philosophy of Right, which begins with abstract right, proceeds to morality (the 
emphasis here is on Kant), includes a discussion of ethical subjectivity, and closes 
with a long discourse on the family, the corporation, and the state.26   
In 1891, when the Outlines was fi rst published, the nature of Hegel’s infl uence 
on Dewey might have been so clear that additional explanation was “hardly needed”; 
although the American Hegelian movement was fading by 1891, the American phil-
osophical community was still steeped in Hegelian thought. A few decades later, 
however, Dewey’s statement was no longer true—Hegel (especially the Philosophy 
of Right) was out of fashion. Th e connection between Dewey’s Outlines and Hegel’s 
ethical thought thus lapsed into the obscurity in which it resides today. 
Aft er having begun the Outlines with some criticism of existing moral frame-
works, Dewey specifi ed his own conception of the moral end. In especially large 
type, he remarked, “Th e moral end or the good is the realization by a person and 
as a person of individuality.”27 Dewey quickly elaborated upon this specifi cation 
of the moral end. Individuality, said Dewey, has two sides: a person’s particular 
capacities and his or her specifi c environment. Th ese two sides are united when a 
person exercises his function. Dewey defi ned “function” as follows: “[It] is a term 
which we may use to express union of the two sides of individuality. Th e idea of 
function is that of an active relation established between power of doing, on one 
side, and something to be done on the other.”28 Dewey elaborated, “A function 
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thus includes two sides—the external and the internal—and reduces them to ele-
ments in one activity.”29
At this point in the text, Dewey has off ered up a preliminary defi nition of the 
good in terms of function. On the surface, it might appear as though he is deviat-
ing from Hegel. Th e preceding exposition suggested that Hegel was an exponent 
of a specifi c notion of freedom as the good, and Dewey is talking about the good in 
terms of function, not freedom. However, a further investigation of Dewey’s notion 
of function will reveal that it actually has a close relationship to beisichselbstsein.
Functions, said Dewey, take the form of interests.30 Interests have several 
important characteristics. Th ey are active—they are connected with the occupa-
tions of human beings.31 Interests are also associated with fi nding satisfaction in 
some object. Dewey elaborated: “Interest is the union in feeling, through action, 
of self and an object…To have an interest then, is to be alert, to have an object, 
and to fi nd satisfaction in an activity which brings this object home to self.” 32 
Bringing the object33 home to self, is, of course, beisichselbstsein—absolute free-
dom in the Hegelian sense. For Dewey, when one has an interest in an object, one 
aims to be with oneself in the object. Th us, the same notion of absolute freedom 
serves as the highest good for both Dewey and Hegel (at least in the Outlines). 
Th is function interest freedom link might appear to be rather tenuous and 
circuitous, but Dewey made the link more directly later in the text—he remarked, 
“In the performance of his own function the agent satisfi es his own interests and 
gains power. In it is found his freedom.”34 
Following the discussion of functions as interests, Dewey devoted the next few 
sections of the text to the task of demonstrating a harmony between individual and 
social interests. Recall that, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel postulated a similar 
harmony between people’s particular and universal interests. Recall the example 
of the good teacher: the teacher has a love of teaching that she fi nds personally 
satisfying, but she also pursues her teaching with a view toward the good of the 
community. Th us, in the case of the good teacher, there is a harmony between the 
individual and social interests. A belief in exactly this kind of harmony was at the 
heart of Dewey’s thought in the Outlines. He commented: “If man is truly a social 
being, constituted by his relationships to others, then social action must inevitably 
realize himself, and be, in that sense, egoistic. And on the other hand, if the in-
dividual’s interest is in himself as a member of society, then such interest is thor-
oughly altruistic.”35 Dewey called this harmony the “ethical postulate.” He makes 
bold claims for this postulate; he says that all moral conduct and moral theory is 
based upon it. He restates it in capital letters, as follows: 
IN THE REALIZATION OF INDIVIDUALITY THERE IS FOUND ALSO 
THE NEEDED REALIZATION OF SOME COMMUNITY OF PERSONS 
OF WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL IS A MEMBER; AND, CONVERSELY, 
THE AGENT WHO DULY SATISFIES THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH 
HE SHARES, BY THAT SAME CONDUCT SATISFIES HIMSELF.36 
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It is abundantly clear that the same principle that is the heart of Hegelian ethical 
life is also at the heart of Dewey’s thought in the Outlines. For Dewey, as for Hegel, 
there was no gulf between acting for your own good and acting for the good of the 
community. For both Dewey and Hegel, one must act in absolute freedom. Acting 
in an absolutely free way means being with yourself in terms of both your work and 
your community. Your work and community must not confront you as alien; they 
must instead be integrated with your self—they must be a part of you. 
The Status of Work in the Outlines 
At this point in the Outlines, Dewey has outlined his core thesis, and the key cor-
respondences to Hegel are visible. Still, some important questions remain about 
how Dewey’s ideal can be realized. In the case of teachers, it is not diffi  cult to see a 
harmony between the realization of the individual and the realization of the com-
munity. However, in the case of some other occupations—the factory worker, for 
example—the harmony between individual and social interests seems somewhat 
more diffi  cult to discern. Dewey devoted signifi cant energy to examining these 
kinds of questions regarding workers. 
One of the fi rst problems that Dewey addressed in this regard is whether 
workers’ occupations were merely a means to some other end. If this were true in a 
broad sense, it would disrupt the harmony between individual and social interests. 
Dewey gave two examples in which this harmony seems to be disrupted: 1) One 
could work merely for the money. 2) One could work merely for the good of soci-
ety. Th ese particular examples of individual-social disharmony are worthwhile; a 
signifi cant number of workers approach their work in the former way, and the lat-
ter approach is also taken occasionally.
Dewey’s response to this problem is as follows—he remarks, “it may be ques-
tioned whether a carpenter whose aim was consciously beyond the work he was 
doing would be a good workman.”37 Clearly, it is possible to work merely for the 
money or merely for society, but Dewey didn’t think that one could be a good worker 
in these instances. Th e good worker may very well think about how she may gain 
from the work, and about how others may gain, but she must not do the work as 
a mere means to either of these two ends. If one is alienated from one’s work in 
this way, one is failing in terms of one’s function; one is failing to work with the 
object and bring it home to one’s self. A worker like this enslaves himself; Dewey 
remarked, “Every action which is not in the line of performance of functions must 
necessarily result in self-enslavement. Th e end of desire is activity, and it is only in 
fullness and unity of activity that freedom is found.”38 As has already been noted, 
both Dewey and Hegel believed that achieving a harmony with one’s work was an 
important aspect of being free.
A related question that Dewey addressed concerns the moral status of the 
good worker. He asked, “Are we ready to say that a good chemist or good carpenter 
or a good citizen is, in so far, a good man?”39 Th is is a reasonable question; a good 
father or a good citizen seems to tend to the interests of others in a way that the 
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good chemist does not. Dewey agreed that a good chemist may not be a good man, 
insofar as “good chemist” means “competent chemist.” However, there is another 
sense of “good,” through which the good chemist can be a good man.40 Dewey 
adopted an orientation that is an important part of Hegel’s ethical thought: an 
ethic of self-actualization.41 In a theory like this, the subject does not have a 
rigid ideal of the “good chemist” in mind that he is “fi lling in.” Instead, he sim-
ply thinks of himself as a good chemist, and chooses actions along the way that 
are in accordance with this ideal. Dewey comments, “It must be remembered 
that the moral end does not refer to some consequence which happens, de facto, 
to be reached. It refers to an end willed, i.e., to an idea held to and realized as an 
idea.”42 In addition, the results that he attains and the amount of approbation he 
receives from others does not matter—Dewey noted, “moral goodness pertains 
to the kind of idea or end which a man clings to, and not to what he happens to 
eff ect visibly to others.”43 
Th is reasoning does not yet establish the goodness of the aspiring chemist—a 
further explanation is needed of the moral signifi cance of work. Dewey’s reasoning 
here is closely aligned with the ethical postulate. He remarked, “Th e position then 
is that intellectual and artistic44 interests are themselves social, when considered in 
the completeness of their relations—that interest in the development of intelligence 
is, in and of itself, interest in the well-being of society.”45 Simply by virtue of his 
interest in the development of intelligence, the aspiring chemist has an interest in 
the improvement of society. Th erefore, since the dedicated, wholehearted worker 
appears to have an interest in society by default, his interest in his work is a moral 
interest. Yet Dewey also noted the good worker has an additional interest in the 
community that is more signifi cant than this default interest. Th is further interest 
is characterized by a faith that the performance of function (of which being a good 
worker is a part) will constitute a good community.46 Clearly, Dewey felt that good 
work, as he defi ned it, was something to aspire to in one’s actions. Good work does 
not make people completely free, but it is a critical part of being free—of being with 
oneself and being with others in a non-alienated way. 
Linking the Outlines to Dewey’s Early Educational Thought  
Dewey’s thought, especially his early work, is suff used with Hegelian ideas. In the 
preceding analysis, I have suggested that one particular idea—Hegel’s notion of 
freedom—is especially prominent in Outlines of a Critical Th eory of Ethics. Yet, the 
Outlines is not the only place in which this idea can be detected; the idea of absolute 
freedom also colors Dewey’s educational thought. 
Th is claim may occasion some skepticism. Morton White contends that, by 
the time Dewey wrote the Outlines (published in 1891), he was already beginning 
to move away from orthodox Hegelianism.47 Dewey had read James’ Principles 
of Psychology in 1891, and had written to James to express his appreciation of the 
book.48 His level of interest in the Principles was high; he held a graduate semi-
nar on the book during the same year.49 In addition to James, other thinkers had 
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a signifi cant infl uence upon Dewey. In his Psychology, Dewey cited the infl uence 
of Johann Herbart, and he also wrote an essay for the National Herbart Society 
in which he acknowledged the importance of Herbart’s educational ideas. Dewey 
was also aware of the ideas of Friedrich Froebel—a chapter of School and Society is 
dedicated to explaining the congruence of Dewey’s system with certain elements 
of Froebel’s educational principles.50 
Yet although James and Herbart were important infl uences upon Dewey, 
Hegel’s infl uence was not eclipsed. In an 1893 letter to his former student, James 
Angell, Dewey wrote, “While I continue to get more and more out of Hegel, I get 
less and less out of the Hegelians so-called.”51 In the same letter, he added, “Meta-
physics has had its day, and if the truths which Hegel saw cannot be stated as direct, 
practical truth s, they are not true.”52 Th is seems to be precisely the task with which 
Dewey was engaged in the Outlines.
Still, a reaffi  rmed commitment to Hegel, in 1893, is not yet enough to satisfy 
those who are skeptical about the connection between Hegel and Dewey’s educa-
tional thought. Dewey’s educational writings did not start in earnest until 1894, 
aft er he had moved to the University of Chicago. Yet although Dewey did not re-
fer directly to Hegel in these educational writings, there is a clear link between his 
thought in the Outlines and his subsequent educational thought. In 1895, one year 
before he started the University Elementary School, Dewey laid out a syllabus for a 
university extension course entitled “Educational Ethics.” Th e fi rst lecture was called 
“Ethical Problem of the School,” and bears the subtitle “WHAT IS A SCHOOL?”53 
Dewey outlined the latter half of the lecture as follows:
IV. Th e Ethic of the School.
1. Ideal is development of social consciousness,
2. Th is defi nition complete, because
a. Recognizing social end.
b. Recognizing individual means.
c. Means and end not external, but i) only end enables us to interpret 
means, and ii) only means gives any content to end.
V. Th is Ethical Standard Must Be Applied.
1. To form, or method.
2. To content, or subject-matter (studies).
3. To school life as whole, vital unity of method and studies.
VI. Th e Ethical Hypothesis or Postulate; Unity of Development of Individual-
ity and of Social Service.54
Th e central role of the ethical postulate is clear. Below this outline, Dewey added 
a reference to the Outlines, as well as to a later book, Study of Ethics.55 Point VI of 
the outline makes direct reference to the ethical postulate, and Point IV is also a 
restatement of the ethical postulate, although Dewey’s language here is less clear. If 
one examines sub point 2c, one can see that Dewey was emphasizing the harmony 
between the means (an individual’s pursuits in terms of work, self, and others) and 
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the end (the good community). Dewey noted that the means and end were “not ex-
ternal,” by which he meant that they were mutually dependent. 
Dewey’s lecture outlines are followed by “exercises” in which he poses ques-
tions to his students. Some of the exercises for the “Ethical Problem of the School” 
lecture illuminate Dewey’s radical aims for the school:
2. What is the theoretical justifi cation of the remark attributed to Leibniz, that 
if he could order the schools of Europe for a generation he could revolution-
ize the civilization of Europe?
3. If the school refl ects community life, and community life depends upon the 
habits acquired in school, can we get out of a hopeless circle?
4. Point out phases of excessive individualism in existing social life that seem 
to you to be developed or reinforced by existing school methods . . . .56
5. Point out facts in the existing school life that positively corroborate the 
postulate.
Th is fi rst lecture on “Educational Ethics” constitutes strong evidence that Dewey had 
a reformist educational agenda that carried a signifi cant tinge of Hegelian ethical 
thought. Notably, this conclusion is also borne out by the closing lecture in the se-
ries, “Th e Problem of Social Progress”—in it, Dewey notes that the school reconciles 
the “two traditionally opposed principles” of the individual and the community. 
He then outlines the link between the school and four other social institutions: the 
family, industrial society, political institutions, and the church.57 Th e remaking of 
the school that Dewey had in mind is clearly one which was consonant with the 
ethical postulate in that it would provide for the harmony of the individual and 
the social. It was a vision of the school that provided for absolute freedom; Dewey 
wanted to build an embryonic society within the school that would allow one to be 
with oneself in terms of one’s work, one’s self, and one’s community. 
Once one is acquainted with Hegel’s ethical thought and Dewey’s adaptation 
of it in the 1895 Educational Ethics course, it is not diffi  cult to detect the infl uence 
of these ideas in other early educational works.58 For example, In “My Pedagogic 
Creed,” (1897) there are a number of pronouncements about the importance of the 
school’s role in harmonizing the individual and the social.59 Th ese sentiments also 
appear in the opening paragraph of the School and Society (1899): “All that society 
has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency of the school, at the disposal 
of its future members. All its better thoughts of itself it hopes to realize through the 
new possibilities thus opened to its future self. Here individualism and socialism 
are one.”60 Individualism and socialism are one precisely because, in keeping with 
the ethical postulate, there is no tension between properly conceived individual 
pursuits and promotion of the good community. 
Th is proposition was clearly refl ected in the way that the Dewey School was 
run. An ethos of cooperation infused the school—one of the key aims of education 
through occupations, the school’s core method, was to develop habits of cooperation 
among the children. Th e children worked together on diffi  cult and intricate tasks 
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(e.g., constructing a smelter to melt metal) which required carefully coordinated 
eff orts. Although Dewey is more widely known today as an advocate of child-cen-
tered education, and there was certainly an emphasis, within the school’s activities, 
on allowing children to develop and pursue their individual interests, there was 
an even stronger emphasis on teaching children to learn and inquire together. In 
the context of Dewey’s early ethical thought, an eff ective education meant teach-
ing children to do good, socially minded, work. Ideally, the individual and social 
dimensions were to be harmonized completely. In his introduction to Mayhew and 
Edwards’s Th e Dewey School, Dewey suggested that “the problem of the relation 
between individual freedom and social well-being,” was central, and emphasized 
that the “chief task” of the school was to create a form of life in which these two 
values could be reconciled.61 
Th e connection between Dewey and Hegel is also illuminating in that some 
of Dewey’s remarks about work in School and Society, which may otherwise seem 
puzzling, become more understandable in light of his earlier adaptation of Hegelian 
views. For example, consider the following remark:
But the great thing for one as for the other is that each shall have had the 
education which enables him to see within his daily work all there is in it of 
large and human signifi cance. How many of the employed are today mere 
appendages to the machines they operate! Th is may be due in part to the 
machine itself or the regime which lays so much stress upon the products of 
the machine, but it is certainly due in large part to the fact that the worker 
has had no opportunity to develop his imagination and his sympathetic 
insight as to the social and scientifi c values found in his work.62
Th ere is an obvious objection that can be off ered in response to these comments. 
If one is an alienated factory worker, it does not seem as though seeing the “social 
and scientifi c value” in one’s work will do much to ameliorate one’s misery. Yet the 
exposition of Dewey’s views on work in the Outlines should clarify Dewey’s point 
here. Dewey believed that seeing the social meaning of work (and understanding 
the science of work is part of seeing the social meaning of it) was a crucial aspect 
of doing good work. Seeing the social signifi cance of the work is what allows it to 
gain a moral signifi cance, to go beyond a mere means to an end. If workers see the 
social signifi cance in their work, they can be at home with it. 
A skeptic might suggest that, regardless of whether the factory worker is at 
home or “with herself” in her work, she is still doing the same repetitive work and 
is still being exploited by the factory owner. Th is view, however, assumes that all 
other conditions are held equal while the worker develops a consciousness of the 
social signifi cance of her work. Workers that were trained through Deweyan edu-
cation through occupations might be disposed to demand changes in the structure 
of work. Th e Dewey School was intended to teach students to appreciate the social 
signifi cance of their work, with a special emphasis on the nature and provenance of 
the science and technology involved.63 Workers who had received an education like 
this might be disposed to demand recognition and power commensurate with the 
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work’s signifi cance. Instead of allowing themselves to be marginalized and exploited 
by others in society, they would demand a transformation of their role in society 
that would allow them to be at home—to be with themselves—in their work. 
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explained that the process of education was 
“to make human beings ethical” and involved the creation of a “second nature” 
through right habit.64 He further suggested that citizens should not see ethical prac-
tice as something outside of them or even something to have faith in, but rather as 
something that was a part of themselves.65 Th e Dewey School accorded with these 
principles completely. Dewey felt that the way to teach a child correct principles 
was to immerse the child in an environment that instantiated those principles con-
stantly. Th is did not mean harping on the importance of learning ethical rules, but 
rather implied the immersion of the child in an ethical community. At fi rst, the 
child learned of ethical principles (e.g., the harmony of the individual and the so-
cial) implicitly through the cooperative ethos of the Dewey School, but later, they 
were encouraged to think about these ideas carefully.66 In this way, students could 
learn to be “with themselves” not just unconsciously, but refl ectively. 
In the fi rst chapter of School and Society, Dewey off ered the following defi -
nition of society: “A society is a number of people held together because they are 
working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common 
aims. Th e common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought and 
growing unity of sympathetic feeling.”67 Th is is a strong defi nition that certainly 
doesn’t describe the liberal democracies of today. Yet, to think of this defi nition as 
descriptive is to miss its signifi cance. Dewey’s defi nition of society was, instead, a 
prescriptive defi nition—a normative, Hegelian defi nition that Dewey hoped would 
become true. Th roughout the course of his career, Dewey moved away from ortho-
dox Hegelianism, but he never abandoned an essential faith in the ethical postulate, 
and thus in a reconciliation of the individual and the social. Th is faith was present 
in the Outlines, it was present in School and Society, and one can also fi nd it in later 
works such as Individualism: Old and New as well. In his early writings, in order 
to move society in the direction of this goal, Dewey had the idea of creating an 
embryonic society within a school. Th e common spirit and common aims of this 
embryonic society were the conditions necessary for the actualization of absolute 
freedom. When he conceived his experimental school, Dewey intended to off er an 
education that was liberal in a strong sense. In essence, he developed a system of 
education that would was not only appropriate for free people, but was also intended 
to help people achieve freedom together. 
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